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Southeast Europe. Finally, there is another 
case from Southeast Europe, where a large 
development agency was planning a substan-
tial project in support of rural reconstruction. 
The funding timetable was set and required 
tight coordination of the various aspects 
of the project if the ambitious goals were to 
be achieved. Should the whole project be 
delayed, risking a reduction of the impact, or 
even a total loss of financial support, to allow 
12 months and a lot of money for mine clear-
ance of affected areas? Or, should the mine- 
contaminated areas suffer “double jeopardy” 
by being excluded from the development 
funding in order to keep the rest of the project 
on track and on budget? 
Linking mine action and development 
may offer a potential solution that is outside 
the usual way of working and prioritizing of 
demining: gradual clearance, which aims to 
clear just enough land, just in time, to ensure 
that key intermediate development goals of 
the overall large project can be met. One part 
of the project, for example, building up a goat 
farm, was planned to take several years, but 
the necessary land was mined. Immediate de- 
mining of access routes and the key build-
ings was needed so that the infrastructure 
could be rehabilitated before the project 
started. Demining of the first part of the pas-
ture could, if necessary, wait a year. Clearing 
further buildings would take a little lon-
ger, but finally, as the herd of goats gradu-
ally increased, the rest of the pasture would 
be cleared. This all makes for slow, inefficient 
and hence relatively expensive demining, but 
the overall gains in development activities 
could be considerable. In this approach, pri-
oritization and task planning for mine clear-
ance would be dominated by the development 
project and its time frame and not by demin-
ing or LIS criteria. 
Conclusion
Many approaches exist concerning demin-
ing and its connection to development within 
affected communities. Clearance projects can 
be successfully completed, but afterward the 
cleared land remains unused, as no develop-
ment program exists to assist the community 
in rebuilding what was lost through war and 
violence. Linking MA and development helps 
to ensure that clearance projects in mined 
communities are not in vain by approaching 
the process in a new, more integrated way. 
See Endnotes, page 110
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A t the first meeting of the cluster-ban process in Oslo, Norway, in February 2007, there were four African countries present: Angola, Egypt, Mozambique and South Africa.  Only three 
states, however, signed the Oslo Declaration at the end of the confer-
ence: Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. A little over a year ago, at 
the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, Africa’s participation in the 
Oslo Process2 began in earnest. There were 14 states present, and consis-
tent with the continent’s overall stance on general and complete disar-
mament, these states spoke out against the dreadful weapons. 
Thereafter, more African countries began to participate in the cause. 
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia 
became actively engaged in the Oslo Process. At the Livingstone African 
Conference on Cluster Munitions, held from 31 March to 1 April 2008, 
in Livingstone, Zambia, the countries of Libya, Namibia and Tunisia, 
never before part of the process, were in attendance. Thirty-nine African 
countries declared that the continent neither wanted the “continued uncon-
trolled proliferation of destructive weapons” on the continent nor to be the 
“dumping ground for weapons obsolete in other parts of the world.”3 
Africa’s Expectations for the CCM Negotiations
For Africa, the Convention on Cluster Munitions would address the 
negative humanitarian effects of these weapons. Since the continent 
is already plagued by crises—including inadequate health care and a 
lack of financial, technological and human-resource capacities—it was 
imperative that strong language be included, particularly on definitions, 
victim assistance and international cooperation and assistance (i.e., 
Articles 2, 5 and 6 respectively of the Convention on Cluster Munitions). 
Africa, in its deliberations during the Dublin Diplomatic Conference 
held in Ireland, felt that assistance in whatever form—technical, finan-
cial or human—was vital, especially for poor countries that lack these 
capacities. In addition, African representatives wanted to avoid the 
inclusion of a clause permitting a transition period or any tolerance of 
interoperability language (i.e., joint military operations with countries 
not adhering to the ban).
After a position was determined, the 38 participating African coun-
tries present spoke as one through Zambia. Four African states (Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Libya) also participated as observers, attending 
meetings and expressing their own views. Strategy meetings were held 
every day during lunch breaks and served as an opportunity for informa-
tion exchange and feedback. Zambia, as the coordinator, had assigned 
different countries to take the lead for the African Group in different 
parallel informal sessions and report back to the full group meetings. 
For instance, Malawi was the lead for Article 21 (interoperability), Sierra 
Leone for Article 5 (victim assistance), Ghana for Article 2 (definitions) 
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On 30 May 2008, the international community adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions.1 It is little won-
der that those who were against a convention of this sort are still reeling from the shock of it. Africa, on the 
other hand, can give itself a well-deserved pat on the back for having played a pivotal role in the adoption of 
a groundbreaking, legally-binding instrument of which posterity will judge the results.
and Uganda for Article 4 (clearance) discussions. This system allowed 
Africa to be well represented and have its views effectively expressed.
Definitions. At the Livingstone Conference, Africa discussed con-
tentious issues at length and agreed on common positions. On the issue 
of definitions, the African consensus was that the draft convention to 
be negotiated in Dublin should provide a categorical prohibition for the 
stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions as a whole cat-
egory, with no distinction over what type may be considered good or 
bad. This approach was deemed critical to making an effective conven-
tion for the protection of civilians. It was argued that this strategy would 
make cluster munitions a stigmatized weapon. Africa also preferred that 
Article 2(c) be deleted from the draft, as its presence provided for an 
opportunity for exceptions to be included. 
In Livingstone, Africa (apart from South Africa, which highlighted 
the military utility of the weapons in terms of their accuracy in point-
targeting) opted for a total ban on cluster munitions. In the African 
view, no cluster munition causes acceptable harm to civilians. In 
Dublin, however, a compromise was reached to limit exceptions—essen-
tially banning about 98 percent of cluster munitions currently in use. It 
was critical to Africa’s position that this compromise was not used to 
exclude cluster munitions that had the same intolerable effects as cluster 
Cluster Munition Coalition campaign workshop held prior to the official Kampala Confer-
ence. North African CMC campaigners Ayman sorour of protection (egypt), left, and Rachid 
Dahmani of Handicap International–Algeria.
ALL pHoTos CouRTesy of MARy WAReHAM
Injury, Fire, Lack of Funding Complicate Demining in Lebanon 
While most of the immediate landmine danger has been removed from southern Lebanon along its border with Israel, multiple 
factors have complicated the demining process throughout the country. In southern Lebanon, 43 percent of the contaminated 
land has been fully cleared, while another 49 percent was surface-cleared, according to the Mine Action Coordination Centre, 
South Lebanon. UNMACC–SL has been a leading force in clearing mines in this area; however, because of a lack of funding, 
many of its clearance teams stopped work at the end of August 2008. As a result, the injury rate is expected to escalate be-
cause, as in the past, locals will likely attempt to remove contaminants themselves when they face a lack of assistance.
In late July 2008, a Lebanese citizen, Abbas Akout, working with the Mines Advisory Group, was injured by a cluster bomb that 
detonated near him while he was attempting to disarm landmines in Zwatar, a village in southern Lebanon. The cluster bomb 
was identified as one of the bombs dropped by Israel in southern Lebanon during 2006. Akout sustained moderate damage to 
his hands and feet. More than 50 Lebanese and international workers, as well as over 250 civilians, have already been injured 
by these cluster bombs.      
Also in July, emergency crews fighting a forest fire in the Bmikin region of Lebanon faced a unique challenge: extinguishing a 
fire in an area where cluster munitions from the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, as well as landmines from the Lebanese Civil 
War, were still polluting the land. The resulting explosions and decreased safety of the area caused several hectares of forest 
(one hectare equals approximately 2.5 acres) to be destroyed before the fire was eventually extinguished.
United Nations
The U.N. has indicated that the demining operations in Lebanon may need to be eliminated without extra funding. The U.S. 
Department of State has given an initial sum of US$825,000 and is working with the American Task Force in Lebanon in the search for 
additional funding to keep the program afloat.
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munitions either at present or in the future. The bur-
den of proof on why certain cluster munitions should be 
exempted was to be on the states proposing the exemption. 
Real evidence needed to be provided to prove that a par-
ticular weapon did not cause unacceptable harm to civil-
ians during and after warfare. The focus was to remain on 
the effects of the weapons.
Victim assistance. Article 5 of the CCM, which relates 
to victim assistance, was also of great concern to Africa, 
particularly to states such as Sierra Leone that have a num-
ber of cluster-munition victims. The African consensus in 
Livingstone was that the draft text was strong and should 
be maintained or strengthened further. It was also agreed 
that reporting on victim-assistance programs should be 
mandatory for States Parties of the CCM—unlike similar 
humanitarian conventions that have left individual states 
to implement victim-assistance programs according to 
their capabilities (if at all). This has allowed states to either 
not implement any programs or have ineffective programs 
in place. The purpose of making assistance reporting man-
datory is to ensure that victims are not forgotten as they 
have been for so long. 
It was essential that past users be held particularly 
responsible for victim assistance. It was noted that, while 
victim assistance would be the primary responsibility of 
States Parties, international cooperation should be an inte-
gral part of their interventions. 
International cooperation and assistance. Article 5 
ties in closely with Article 6, which addresses interna-
tional cooperation and assistance. Africa called for strong 
language to be reflected in Article 6, which would hold 
past users liable for any clean-up in the territory where 
they used the weapons. As expected, there was fierce 
opposition to such language. The reality remains that 
Africa lacks the capability to rid itself of these weapons 
without external assistance. The lessons learned from 
the shortcoming of such a lack of liability in the Anti- 
personnel Mine Ban Convention4 made it imperative to 
hold past users liable in some way. The final language, 
which only “strongly encourages” past users to assist, is 
likely to have the same inadequacies as those of the Mine 
Ban Convention; furthermore, complexities attached to 
the appropriate methods of clearance that do not result 
in negative environmental consequences make it imper-
ative that assistance be provided. In Livingstone, it was 
agreed that the CCM text needed to be strengthened in 
accordance with international law by obliging past users 
to provide financial, technical, material and human assis-
tance to States Parties. In debating this article, Zambia 
and a number of other states emphasized the need for this 
inclusion in the final text. The provision of cooperation 
and assistance was also to apply to clearance, victim assis-
tance and risk education. 
Interoperability. Of all the contentious issues, 
that of interoperability was the most problematic. 
Countries on the opposite side of the debate, such 
as the United Kingdom and other NATO members, 
argued for the need for specific text regarding States 
Parties’ obligations in relation to the CCM during 
joint-military operations with non-States Parties. 
Article 21 will therefore be a thorn in of the side of the 
African contingent supporting the CCM; Africa will 
be watching closely to ensure clauses are not used as loopholes by States Parties 
acting with non-States Parties. This issue will probably serve as the litmus test 
of the credibility of the convention.
Transition periods. The draft CCM convention text of Article 21, the basis of the 
negotiations in Dublin, did not allow for a transition period to use banned cluster 
munitions, and the African delegation agreed that this language should be retained in 
the final document. It was felt that allowing for a transition period would be defeating 
the main purpose of the CCM, which was to ban cluster munitions. 
The Outcome of the Negotiations
Most of Africa should have been ecstatic that at least one whole category of weap-
ons affecting many African states had effectively been banned; however, this was not 
so. African states at the Livingstone Conference, except for South Africa, wanted an 
absolute ban on these weapons, which would most likely end up in their territories 
that are prone to conflict and wars. The African consensus at the Dublin Conference, 
however, was to approve a convention that banned as many of the currently used clus-
ter munitions as possible. More importantly, Africa’s consolation upon reflection on 
the process is that the use of cluster munitions is now effectively stigmatized. 
Despite noticeable shortcomings in the final document, which the African contin-
gent agreed to provided no other delegations reopen the text, Africa was pleased with 
many provisions in the convention. African negotiators were particularly pleased 
with the comprehensiveness of Article 5, which deals with the long-neglected issue 
of victim assistance. In Livingstone, the African contingent was expected to set a 
new standard that would look at the plight of the victims of explosive remnants of 
war in general and cluster munitions in particular. States Parties would be required 
to do more than ever for the victims of conflicts. To say that the final convention 
language is ambitious is an understatement, and Africa is certainly satisfied with it. 
Affected countries like Sierra Leone will undoubtedly be able to do more for their peo-
ple because of this convention. 
Developmental Impact
ERW contamination has an adverse impact 
on development. Landmine and ERW contam-
ination continues to be a major hindrance to 
economic development on most of the African 
continent; cluster munitions would exacerbate 
this situation even further. Ethiopia and Eritrea 
certainly face these challenges in their post-
conflict reconstruction. The one area in which 
the weapons were used in Zambia remains con-
taminated and unutilized over 20 years after 
munition deployment. Africa, therefore, could 
not stress enough the necessity of international 
cooperation and assistance and will use Article 
6 as one measure of the convention’s success. 
The omission of transition periods, though 
not much of a bargaining chip, was a major con-
solation to African countries that felt that many 
concessions had been given without recip-
rocal goodwill. Such a provision would have 
permitted the continued use of cluster muni-
tions after the convention had entered into 
force, thus defeating the purpose of the ban.
The CCM is largely a convention on whose 
final outcome Africa can proudly claim to have 
had considerable influence. Africa had one of 
the largest blocs at the Dublin Conference, and 
therefore its position on any issue was critical. 
Had Africa insisted on a total ban—a position 
held by most Latin American and other lesser-
developed countries—there would have been 
a deadlock. This was an undesirable outcome, 
which was avoided by the conference’s Irish 
CMC campaign workshop in preparation for the Kampala Conference.
Presidency, by holding several informal con-
sultations on the sidelines with all participants, 
including African states. That in less than two 
years, the Oslo Process was able to achieve 
what the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons5 had failed to do in almost a decade 
is a great accomplishment in itself. 
Which Way Forward?
What remains to be seen is how well imple-
mentation of the convention will turn out. 
Africa, for its part, remains determined to 
continue leading, ensuring that momentum is 
maintained and that national implementation 
measures are put in place well before entry into 
force of the CCM. To this end, a second African 
conference on cluster munitions was held in 
Kampala, Uganda, 29–30 September 2008.6 
At the end of the two-day meeting, the 
Kampala Action Plan was adopted by accla-
mation by the over 40 African countries pres-
ent. The Kampala Action Plan prescribes a 
number of actions the states are encouraged 
to undertake before and after the Oslo Signing 
Conference scheduled for 2–4 December 2008. 
All the states agree to travel to Oslo to sign 
the CCM, to publically signal their intent to 
sign, to ratify the CCM as soon as possible, to 
immediately undertake interim internal mea-
sures to ensure the effective implementation 
of the Convention, and to engage civil society, 
nongovernmental organizations and interna-
tional agencies such as the United Nations and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross 
to ensure public awareness and support for the 
CCM.7 Only South Africa expressed reserva-
tions as it was still in the process of reviewing 
its own internal policies regarding the matter. 
The issue of banning cluster munitions has 
also been taken up by the African Union, which 
has urged its Member States to support the ini-
tiative.8 States that were not in Dublin for the 
adoption of the CCM are also being encouraged 
to get on board and be present for the signing 
in Oslo in December 2008. With the exten-
sive participation of Africa in the ban process 
(if in Oslo 30 states sign and ratify the CCM 
simultaneously, as some have indicated they 
would endeavor to do), it would be enough 
for the convention to enter into force by mid-
2009 even if no other states signed and ratified 
it. During informal African contingent delib-
erations at the Dublin Conference, there were 
suggestions that the group could even go a step 
further and declare Africa a “cluster munitions-
free zone” by developing an African convention 
banning the weapon on the continent. 
                        See Endnotes, page 110
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The Kampala Conference on Cluster Munitions was held at the Imperial Royal Hotel.
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